We develop a dynamic model of a collateralized asset market with asymmetric information, and use it study how government interventions designed to boost liquidity in frozen markets affect private incentives to maintain high-quality assets. We show that small interventions can lead to "intervention traps" -expectations concerning future interventions destroy private incentives to improve the quality of collateral, which stunts recovery and warrants continued market intervention -even when they restore market liquidity. Bigger interventions may lead to faster recoveries, and it may be efficient to continue to intervene even after market liquidity is restored. This runs counter to previous findings in static environments where it is optimal to keep interventions as small as possible, and to intervene only when markets are illiquid.
Introduction
Monetary authorities increasingly rely on asset purchase programs to stimulate economic activity and to restore liquidity in financial markets during times of stress. These programs, which initially focused on purchases of government debt, have recently been expanded to include a broader set of privately-produced financial assets, such as corporate bonds, mortgage-backed securities, or bank-originated asset-backed securities. For example, the European Central Bank began exchanging investment grade corporate bonds for government debt under the Eurosystem's Corporate Sector Purchase Programme starting in 2016. This raises the concern that the opportunity to sell relatively low-quality assets to monetary authorities may affect the incentives of private agents to produce high-quality assets, harming the long-run health of financial markets.
We explore this incentive channel of capital market interventions in a parsimonious dynamic model of collateralized lending under asymmetric information. As in standard models of adverse selection, markets are liquid in a given period if and only if the fraction of good asset is sufficiently high. A large negative shock to asset quality may therefore result in the breakdown of lending markets due to adverse selection. This provides the scope for the government to improve welfare through interventions that restore market liquidity.
The novel aspect of our analysis is that asset quality is endogenously determined by costly unobservable effort undertaken by borrowers. This means that markets remain liquid only if sufficiently many borrowers find it privately optimal to exert effort. Private incentives in turn depend on the relative value of owning a good or bad asset. Since valuations depend on market conditions, this gives rise to a two-way feedback between market liquidity and incentives. We use this framework to show that interventions which targets liquidity but ignore the feedback to incentives may lead to long-run declines in average asset quality. As a result, such interventions may be strictly dominated by bigger interventions that target both market liquidity and incentives.
In the model, good assets and bad assets differ in both the cash flows that can be pledged to lenders (the collateral value) and the cash flows that cannot be pledged conditional on investment (the divertable return). In order to obtain financing, thus, borrowers must post a fraction of their asset's pledgeable cash flows as collateral. Lenders are un-informed about the quality of the underlying collateral. Hence they charge an adverse selection premium that is decreasing in the fraction of good assets. (Going forward, we refer to the fraction of good assets as average asset quality.) This force leads to an effort complementarity: owning a good asset is more valuable when the adverse selection premium is low, and so it is beneficial to exert effort when many other borrower do so as well.
Markets break down due to adverse selection if average asset quality is too low. If this is the case, then borrowers cannot invest. Hence they consume the cash flows they would otherwise have pledged as collateral. If the difference in collateral values between good and bad assets is sufficiently large, a local substitutability in effort arises at the liquidity threshold: since borrowers must pledge all of their collateral when markets are just liquid, the relative value of good assets drops as soon as markets become liquid. Consequently, it is privately optimal to shirk when average asset quality is expected to be such that markets are just liquid. Both channels combine to ensure that effort incentives are determined by expectations of future market liquidity.
In the absence of regulation, we show that this structure gives rise to at most three (approximate) steady states for asset quality, and that there exist equilibrium paths for asset quality that asymptote to exactly one of these steady states. In a full recovery equilibrium, all borrowers exert effort in every period and the fraction of good assets asymptotes to 1. In a no recovery equilibrium, all borrowers shirk in every period and the fraction of good assets asymptotes to zero. In a partial recovery equilibrium, a positive fraction of borrowers exerts effort in every period and average quality fluctuates randomly in a tight interval around the liquidity cutoff. Within this interval, the probability of markets being liquid in a given period is such that borrowers are willing to mix between effort and shirking. Hence we refer to the liquidity threshold as an approximate steady state. 1 Against this background, we study the dynamic effects of market interventions designed to alleviate market breakdowns. Period-by-period, the efficiency gain from such interventions stems from the notion in Holmstöm and Tirole (1998) that the government can use its taxation power to render cash flows pledgeable that could otherwise not be pledged. In static settings with fixed asset quality, Tirole (2012) and Philippon and Skreta (2012) show that interventions aimed at providing relief to illiquid markets should keep kept as small as 1 See Definition 4 for formal definition possible. That is, conditional on asset quality, the regulator should intervene just enough to ensure that private markets are liquid.
Whether or not regulators can improve upon such minimal interventions in our dynamic setting depends on their ability to commit to future interventions. If regulators cannot commit, then the optimal policy problem is equivalent to a sequence of static intervention problems with fixed asset quality. Hence the insights from Tirole (2012) and Philippon and Skreta (2012) apply and regulators always intervene minimally. In the dynamic setting considered here, this may have deleterious long-run consequences, however. The reason is that mininmal interventions may entirely eliminate private effort incentives precisely because they focus only on restoring liquidity. Hence asset quality declines and the regulator is forced to intervene time and again due to an "intervention trap" -it is optimal to intervene because markets are illiquid, but interventions further harm asset quality.
We show that regulators endowed with the ability to commit to policies one period head can do strictly better. Under commitment, regulators to can credibly promise the terms of an intervention prior to borrowers' effort decisions. This allows regulators to design interventions that explicitly account for their impact on both liquidity and incentives. Specifically, we find that it may be optimal to commit to per-unit subsidies that are larger than the minimal intervention. The reason is that "large" interventions boost private incentives by lowering the expected adverse selection premium. Committing to larger interventions may have the added benefit of strictly lowering the ex-post aggregate subsidy: by increasing the fraction of good assets, the cost of the intervention may be lower even if the per-unit subsidy is larger.
Regulators may also want to commit to intervene in states of the world where markets would be liquid even in the absence of intervention. The result contrasts with Tirole (2012) and Philippon and Skreta (2012) , who find that it is optimal to intervene only if markets are illiquid. The intuition for this result stems from the approximate steady state at the liquidity threshold under laissez-faire. In this region, effort substitutability outweighs complementarities conditional on liquidity. As such, asset quality is high enough to prevent markets from deteriorating, but not high enough for all borrowers to consistently exert effort. Absent intervention, individual borrowers prefer to free-ride on aggregate quality improvements whenever a sufficiently large fraction of other borrowers exerts effort, hindering full recovery. To overcome this dynamic coordination problem, a regulator can promise a small subsidy that absorbs enough of the lower adverse selection cost that restores full effort incentives until quality rises above to a level at which it self-sustains. Lower discount factor increases the scope for intervention to improve efficiency by resolving dynamic coordination problem.
Finally, regulators with a binding budget constraint may find it optimal to delay intervention. If market quality starts out below the approximate steady state around the liquidity threshold, then average asset quality in the laissez-faire economy asymptotes to the liquidity threshold. Intervening early efficiently restores market liquidity but does not improve upon private effort incentives (since borrowers would have exerted effort anyway). Intervening only once we reach the approximate steady foregoes the efficiency gains from early market liquidity, but allows the economy to transition into the self-sustaining effort region. Hence waiting may be optimal as long as the regulator is sufficiently patient and budget constraints prevent the regulator from intervening in every period. This result differs from Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) , who study a setting with fixed asset quality but dynamic trading and show that it is optimal to intervene as soon as possible. Chiu and Koeppl (2016) show that waiting to intervene be optimal in settings with fixed asset quality and search frictions. Their result is based on the notion that future interventions increase selling pressure in frictional markets today, alleviating adverse selection and giving rise to an announcement effect that can be exploited by regulators. In our setting instead regulators may prefer to wait because asset quality may partially recover even in the absence of interventions.
Related Literature. Our paper is most closely related to Tirole (2012) and Philippon and Skreta (2012) , who study how public interventions can jump-start markets frozen due to adverse selection, and how to best design such interventions. Their focus lies on studying how participation constraints for the government program depend on the endogenous response of the competitive allocation. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) consider a similar setting in which private trading occurs dynamically, and show an initial subsidy and subsequent tax on trade can improve allocations, fixing the distribution of asset quality. Our approach is to analyze how the expectation of future interventions affects private incentives to produce high-quality collateral, and to study conditions under which interventions may either lead to a sustained lack of high-quality collateral, or complement private effort incentives. Camargo, Kim, and Lester (2016) and Bond and Goldstein (2015) argue that government interventions may have a detrimental effect on private information acquisition that must be traded off against the benefits of unfreezing asset markets. We share their focus on studying potential downsides of market interventions, but do so by studying the dynamics of asset quality itself.
A key feature of our model is that all lending must be collateralized as in Gorton and Ordoñez (2014) or Fostel and Geanakoplos (2015) . This structure implies a divergence between pledgeable cash flows and those that are inalienable from the asset holder. When markets are liquid, collateral is pledged at a pooling price, thereby diluting the private value of holding a good collateral asset and reducing effort incentives. Hence it is precisely when there is dispersion in collateral values that expected market liquidity hampers effort incentives. Choi, Santos, and Yorulmazer (2016) also study a model of collateralized lending and ask which types of collateral central banks should lend against to boost asset market liquidity. They show that when the central bank can distinguish between good and bad collateral, policies demanding good collateral in exchange for liquidity provisions impose negative externalities on private markets. In our setting, we assume that the central bank is as uninformed as financial market participants when assessing asset value, and study the endogenous dynamics of asset quality under interventions.
Layout. Section 2 lays out the model environment. Section 3 analyzes the baseline model absent government intervention. We introduce government interventions in Section 4 and outline its impact on incentives. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Model
Time is discrete and infinite, t = 1, . . . , ∞. There is a unit measure of borrowers (which we refer to as farmers), a unit measure of investors, and a regulator. All agents are risk neutral. Farmers and the regulator are infinitely lived, while investors live for one period. Investors are competitive with deep pockets, and have access to an outside storage technol-ogy with one-period return 1 + r f . Long-lived agents discount the future using the discount factor β ∈ [0, 1).
Production technology and endowments. Each farmer owns and operates a long-lived investment technology called an asset. Assets can only be operated by farmers. Assets are of quality θ ∈ {g, b}. Hence they are either good or bad. In each period, an asset of quality θ generates a risk-free return of L θ with or without investment, where
Each farmer can also invest 1 unit of capital in his asset. This generates an additional return of R θ with probability p θ , and 0 otherwise. We assume p g R g ≥ max{p b R b , 1 + r f }. Good assets thus offer greater safe returns and greater expected risky returns than bad assets.
At the beginning of each period, each farmer can exert unobservable effort at private non-pecuniary costc to improve or maintain the quality of his asset. The realized quality of his asset conditional on effort is stochastic. Let e ∈ {0, 1} denote the effort decision, where e = 1 if the farmer exerts effort. Given initial asset quality θ, the probability distribution over new asset quality θ is: 
Here π captures the incremental value of effort for maintaining or producing a good asset. Generically, we assume that the effort outcome is i.i.d across agents. To allow for mixed strategies in effort, however, we sometimes allow for arbitrarily small correlations in effort outcomes so as to introduce small amounts of noise in the aggregate law of motion for asset quality. We provide further detail where necessary. We denote the realized fraction of good assets (conditional on effort outcomes) in period t by λ t . The initial condition is λ 0 . There is asymmetric information: each farmer is privately informed about the quality of his asset. For simplicity, the fraction of good assets is common knowledge.
Assumption 1 (Information Structure). The quality of each individual asset is the private information of the farmer who owns the asset. The aggregate fraction of good trees λ t is common knowledge.
Capital markets. We assume that farmers cannot save. In order to invest, farmers must therefore borrow 1 unit of capital from investors. Investors lend competitively to farmers, subject to outside option 1 + r f . The key friction is that farmers are subject to limited pledgability as in Tirole (2012) . Specifically, we assume that farmers can fully divert the returns on investment R θ . Since L θ is obtained with certainty, we assume that ex-post L θ is verifiable and thus pledgeable.
Assumption 2 (Limited Pledgeability). Only L θ is plegeable to investors.
Given that only L θ is pledgeable and investors are short-lived, we let investors offer one-period collateralized debt contracts characterized by (i) face value B, and (ii) the right to seize up to B of farmers' risk-free return L θ if the farmer defaults B. We limit our attention to renegotiation proof contracts, which implies that investors can extract at most L θ from a farmer of type θ. (We adopt the tie-breaking rule that investors do not seize assets if they have obtained L θ .) 2
Timing. The timing in each period is summarized in Figure 1 . In the beginning of the period, each farmer makes an effort decision. Conditional on the effort decision, the new quality of each asset is realized according to the effort technology specified in Equation 1. 
Figure 1: Timing of Events in Period t
After observing the aggregate quality λ t , investors decide whether to finance farmers. If they choose to do so, farmers borrow and invest. If they do not, there is no investment. Lastly, output is realized, farmers decide whether to default, and accounts are settled.
Equilibrium Concept. Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. At each period t, farmers choose an effort and investment strategy to maximizes their conditional expected payoffs at t, and investors make lending decision to farmers, subject to a breakeven condition that determines the equilibrium lending rate B * (λ). Farmers and investors' beliefs are consistent with Bayes rule whenever possible.
Laissez-faire Economy
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium in the absence of government intervention. Prior to the analysis, we define two market conditions to refer to market liquidity and market recovery: Definition 1. Markets are liquid in period t if farmers can obtain capital from investors to invest.
Definition 2. Markets have recovered in period t if markets are liquid in period t and in some period τ > t. Markets have fully recovered in period t if they are liquid for all τ ≥ t.
With these definitions in mind, we now characterize the determinants of market liquidity. Second, we study farmer's effort incentives and the endogenous evolution of asset quality, which crucially determines the dynamics of asset market recovery.
Determinants of market liquidity. Given investors' outside option 1 + r f , a contract with face value B, and a fraction of good assets λ, investors are willing to lend only if
The min-operators encode the optimal default decision of farmers, which is to default whenever B exceeds the collateral value. Hence it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to B ≤ L g . Since L b < 1 + r f , it follows that there exists a a thresholdλ such that markets are liquid if and only if λ ≥λ. This threshold is
Since investors have deep pockets and are competitive, (2) holds with equality whenever λ ≥λ. The equilibrium face value of debt is thus given by
and is decreasing in λ. Increases in average asset quality thus lower funding costs by reducing the adverse selection discount.
The evolution of average asset quality. We now study the equilibrium evolution of average asset quality. At the beginning of period t, the fraction of good assets is λ t−1 , and it evolves as a function of farmers' effort decisions. Let µ θ be the fraction of famers of type θ who exert effort, and recall that good assets remain good with probability 1 − π while bad assets remain bad with probability 1 if the farmer shirks. Then law of motion for λ t is
. Effort incentives. We now turn to farmer's incentives to exert effort. In each period t, farmers make their effort decision based on their beliefs about the current and average asset quality {λ τ } τ≥t . Since the aggregate law of motion for asset quality is in turn determined by individual effort decision, an equilibrium consists of a fixed point such that individual effort decisions give rise to a sequence {λ t } that is consistent with individual incentives given initial condition λ 0 .
Start by defining the one-period payoff of an asset of type θ given λ as
and let ∆v(λ) = v g (λ) − v b (λ) denote the difference in one-period payoffs given λ. An important feature of the model is that effort is complementary conditional on market liquidity. The reason is that borrowing costs decrease in the fraction of good borrowers. This makes it more valuable to own a good asset.
Lemma 1 (Complementarities). ∆v(λ) is strictly increasing in
To fully characterize a farmer's effort decision, we must take into account the entire dynamic of λ t . We can characterize the value function V θ (λ) of an individual farmer with asset of type θ as follows:
where λ follows the law of motion (3). Let
. This reveals the condition under which a farmer of type θ exerts effort:
Lemma 2. Given a sequence {λ t } for t = 0, 1, 2, ..., ∞, a farmer of type θ exerts effort in period τ if and only if:
future expected value of effort
Hence farmers' equilibrium effort decision is driven by the current payoff of a good asset and the sum of future expected payoffs from exerting effort. Importantly, this incentivecompatibility condition is independent of the farmer's current type.
Laissez-faire Equilibrium
We now study the equilibrium evolution of asset quality in the absence of interventions. We are particularly interested in whether markets endogenously recover from periods of illiquidity. Complementarities typically give rise to equilibrium multiplicity. The same is true here, in that farmers may find it optimal to exert effort when all other farmers do, but prefer to shirk if all other farmers shirk. This type of multiplicity is not the focus of this paper. Hence we assume that farmers always coordinate on the equilibrium with maximum effort. This allows us to characterize conditions such that markets fail to recover even when there are no coordination failures.
As a first step, show that there exists a steady state in which all assets are good so long as the cost of effort is not too high.
That is, so long as c < ∆v (1) 1−β , all farmers find it privately optimal to exert effort if λ = 1, and aggregate asset quality never declines. An economy with this property serves as a useful benchmark for understanding whether markets may recover from negative shocks to λ. We therefore maintain the following (stricter) assumption for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 3. c < v(1).
Given this benchmark, we now study equilibrium starting from some arbitrary λ 0 < 1. This initial condition need not be a steady state. Hence one might think of our exercise as studying the market response to a negative shock to asset quality at some steady state. Given an initial λ 0 , an equilibrium consists of a sequence {λ * t } t≥0 , farmers' equilibrium effort decisions consistent with the law of motion specified by Equation (3), and investor optimality. We define three types of equilibria, and note that any equilibrium belongs to one of these types.
Definition 3. Given an initial condition λ 0 , we call an equilibrium a:
1. full recovery equilibrium if full recovery occurs at some τ > 0, 2. recovery equilibrium if, for any t > 1, there exists some τ 1 > t such that markets have recovered at τ 1 , and there does not exist a τ 2 > t such that markets have fully recovered at τ 2 , 3. no recovery equilibrium if there exists some t > 0 at which markets remain illiquid for ∀τ ≥ t.
To effectively characterize these equilibria, it is useful to introduce a broader notion of steady states.
Definition 4. λ * is an approximate steady state if, for some equilibrium path {λ t } ∞ t=0 , there exists a τ such that λ t ∈ (λ * − , λ * + ) for arbitrarily small > 0 for ∀t ≥ τ.
We next show that there exist at most three approximate steady states for average asset quality, and that each is associated with one of the three types of equilibrium defined above. Proposition 1. There exist at most two equilibrium steady states for average asset quality, λ * = 0 and λ * = 1. In addition, there exists at most one approximate steady state given by λ * =λ. In any full recovery equilibrium, lim t→∞ λ t = 1. In any no recovery equilibrium, lim t→∞ λ t = 0. In any recovery equilibrium, there exists some τ such that λ t ∈ (λ − ,λ + ) for arbitrarily small > 0 for ∀t ≥ τ.
Given Proposition 1, we can focus on characterizing the set of equilibria with long-run (approximate) steady state λ * ∈ {1, 0,λ}. The first step is to identify the set of permissible λ 0 for which there exists an equilibrium path to full recovery. To do so, we identify conditions under which farmers' effort is compatible with a path of {λ t } consistent with full recovery. Since future payoffs can be recursively expressed as a sum of one-period returns, we can build on Lemma 1 to infer properties of a feasible equilibrium sequence {λ t }. In particular, noticing that ∆v(λ) is monotonically increasing in λ for λ ≥λ leads to the following cutoff argument.
Lemma 4.
There exists a minimum cutoffλ ∈ [λ, 1) such that, if λ t+1 ≥λ, then it is privately optimal for each farmer to exert effort in all periods τ ≥ t conditional on all other farmers exerting effort in all periods τ ≥ t.
The logic behind this result is the following. Suppose that average asset quality tomorrow is expected to be such that the value difference exceeds the cost of effort, and that the expected asset quality will be realized if all farmers exert effort today. Then it is indeed optimal for all farmers to exert effort today, and asset quality increases. Since incentives are stricty increasing in λ, moreover, this argument also holds from tomorrow onwards. For the same reason, it is possible to find the smallest λ in [λ, 1) such that effort is optimal from today onward. This defines the minimum cutoffλ. Noting that the law of motion for asset quality is λ t+1 = λ t + π(1 − λ t ) if all farmers exert effort gives the next result. The previous results hold for any c so long as Assumption 3 is satisfied. However, they rely on λ 0 being sufficiently high. We now extend the set of initial values that permit full recovery by considering all λ 0 such that there exists an equilibrium path to some λ t that satisfies Lemma 4. 
The opposite argument can be used to identify the set of λ t that preclude full recovery. Note that no effort is a strictly dominant strategy for any λ t ∈ (λ,λ). Ifλ >λ + (1 −λ)π, then there does not exist any λ t −1 ≤λ that permits a transition into some λ t ≥λ. Together this implies the following:
Nonexistence of a full recovery equilibrium means that markets do not recover from a sufficiently bad initial condition (or, equivalently, from a sufficiently negative shock). In such cases, the long-run λ * either takes a valueλ or 0. We now show that recovery occurs only if c < ∆L 1−β , but that average asset quality deteriorates to 0 otherwise. 
Discussion
The laissez-faire equilibrium demonstrates how markets cope with adverse selection in the absence of regulation. We showed that farmers can collectively improve asset quality and quickly restore market liquidity if initial asset quality is not too poor. After large negative shocks, instead, markets either deterioriate to the point where no good assets are left, or they partially recover, with asset quality hovering around the liquidity threshold. In either case, markets are no longer liquid with certainty, and there may be inefficient breakdowns in trade. This provides scope for government interventions. We discuss this next.
Model with Capital Market Interventions
Given the benchmark laissez-faire economy developed in the previous section, we now turn to assessing the impact of government interventions designed to restore liquidity. We focus particularly on the interaction of interventions and private effort incentives.
In many real-world situations, a constraint on pledgeability (e.g. shortage of good collateral) is thought to be at the heart of market breakdowns due to adverse selection. In this context, a natural policy to consider is one in which the regulator injects liquidity into the economy in order to relax borrowing constraints. Recent examples include the Fed's Term Securities Lending Facility (stopped in 2010) and the ECB's Securities Lending Programme (continued), which explicitly aimed to upgrade the collateral available to private borrowers by providing downside insurance to lenders or by engaging in swaps for low-quality collateral prone to adverse selection. With this in mind, we extend the model by introducing a regulator that can implement such policies with a view towards affecting market liquidity. We assume that the regulator is long-lived and risk-neutral, and has the same discount factor β ∈ [0, 1) as farmers.
Policy instrument. The main policy instrument we consider is government insurance for investors against farmer defaults. At the beginning of every period t, and before farmers make their effort decisions, the regulator announces a policy {q, I}. This policy consists of a payment q to an investor in the event that the farmer he has lent to defaults (by failing to pay the full amount B), and specifies the set of values of λ ∈ I ⊆ [0, 1] conditional on which the policy is implemented. Hence, the policy is a partial state-contingent guarantee for investors, and thus serves to relax participation constraints. After λ t is realized, the regulator implements the intervention. In Section 4.4, we show an equivalence between this policy program and a broader set of intervention tools, such as direct intervention or interest rate policy. This is reminiscent of Philippon and Skreta (2012) , who argue that the precise implementation of policies is not important, and that a sufficient statistic is the borrowing rate in the private market. The same is true here: all policies that deliver the same equilibrium face value of debt B conditional on market liquidity are equivalent.
Policy Regimes. We focus on two policy regimes, which differ with respect to commitment. The first is no commitment. Under no commitment, the regulator is not committed to implementing the policy he announced at the beginning of the period (prior to effort decision). Hence it is as if he is choosing the intervention policy {q, I} after observing λ t . The second is commitment. Under commitment, the regulator credibly commits to implementing the policy {q, I} he announced prior to the effort decision. In either regime, we assume that the regulator cannot commit to a time path of future interventions. Hence we permit the regulator to condition on the relevant aggregate state variable λ, but we do not allow for polices that are contingent on calendar time. 3 The timing of events with market intervention is summarized in Figure 2 . Regulator's objective. We use S(λ, {q, I}) to denote the per-period cost of intervention for a policy {q, I} for λ. Since only bad farmers default, it is given by
We start by assuming that the regulator is unconstrained in terms of resources, and his expected payoff is given by the discounted sum of total expected farmer utility net of the cost of intervention.
This is an appropriate welfare criterion here given that investors are competitive and have deep pockets, and thus and always earn 1 + r f .
Market Intervention and Impact on Incentives
We now turn to characterizing the equilibrium under market interventions. We begin by incorporating intervention into investors' lending decisions. For a given intervention {q, I}, investors' participation constraint is
That is, if the intervention is implemented, then investors expect to receive an additional q units of capital from the government when a farmer defaults. Conditional on investors' participation condition being satisfied, the competitive face value of debt B(λ, {q, I}) as a function of intervention is thus given by
As expected, the borrowing cost drops with respect to the subsidy q provided by the government to investors.
Lemma 5. For λ ∈ I, B(λ, {q, I}) strictly decreases in q.
This implies that interventions affect the market value of good and bad assets by reducing the adverse selection discount. Given some λ and policy {q, I}, the per-period value of an asset of type θ is given by
Similar to the laissez-faire economy, a wedge arises conditional on market liquidity. As long as market quality is sufficiently high (i.e. λ ≥λ), farmers are able to access capital and invest even if λ / ∈ I. However, the intervention boosts asset values by lowering B for all λ ∈ I. In this way, the policy may enable farmers to invest even when λ is such that adverse selection would otherwise lead to market breakdowns.
Optimality of full recovery. It is clear that market interventions can restore liquidity. In principle, interventions may also induce a full recovery equilibrium by solving a dynamic coordination problem between borrowers who would otherwise find it privately optimal shirk (as in the laissez-faire equilibrium for sufficiently low λ 0 and high c). Before studying whether this is the case, it is useful to first understand the conditions under which full recovery is, in fact, efficient relative to laissez-faire.
To highlight this, suppose for now that there exists some policy such that, for some initial value λ 0 ≤λ, an equilibrium path {λ t } leading to full recovery exists under this policy. Let F(λ, t) = π ∑ t−1 i=0 (1 − π) i + (1 − π) t λ for t ≥ 1 and F(λ, 0) = λ 0 define the law of motion under full effort by all farmers in every period. We can then express the discounted net output under such this proposed policy recursively:
Four insights are worth noting:
1. since any subsidy is transfer to investors, optimality solely depends on the sum of discounted payoffs net of the effort cost (c) and opportunity cost (1 + r f );
2. Relative to a full recovery laissez-faire equilibrium, if the expected payoff from the
full recovery induced by the intervention generates (weakly) greater output. Hence, there exists a cutoff λ for which λ 0 > λ implies that intervention improves efficiency relative to a full recovery laissez-faire equilibrium;
3. As β increases, the value of resolving the dynamic coordination problem increases. To see this, consider the stark case when β approaches 1 and λ 0 ∈ (λ,λ −π 1−π ). It is straightforward to see that the long-run one-period net output under intervention p g R g + L g − (1 + r f ) −c is strictly greater than the long-run one-period net output under laissez-faire equilibria with λ * < 1. This implies that for any λ 0 ∈ (λ,λ −π 1−π ), there exists a sufficiently large β such that intervention improves efficiency for λ 0 . Noting that first term in Equation 13 monotonically increases in λ 0 , let λ ∅ (β) denote the minimum λ 0 for a given β for which intervention obtains (weakly) greater output relative to laissez-faire.
Given that our primarily goal is understanding how market intervention interacts with incentives, we focus on the case in which interventions that induce full recovery and provide liquidty improve efficiency relative to laissez-faire for λ 0 ≥ λ:
Minimal Intervention and Intervention Traps
Under no commitment, the intervention is essentially chosen after observing λ t . Hence we must characterize the optimal {q, I} given λ. Since future λ is independent of current policy, it is optimal to restore liquidity in illiquid markets so long as the expected output of the average asset is above a treshold. Moreover, the regulator chooses the smallest q that is consistent with market liquidity, and intervenes only if markets are illiquid. This leads to the following result, which is closely related to Tirole (2012). Under no commitment, the regulator's policy strategy involved intervening only when necessary to provide relief to an otherwise illiquid market, and offering the minimal subsidization q required to restore market liquidity. In effect, the regulator implements a policy of "minimal intervention", in that he intervenes if and only if markets are ex-post illiquid, i.e. λ <λ, and provides the minimum effective intervention. 4 While a policy of minimal intervention aims to provides liquidity only when necessary, farmers' ex-ante incentives are affected by the expectation of intervention. In particular, because minimal intervention involves injecting just enough liquidity such that markets are liquid, farmers effectively anticipate market conditions akin to λ =λ, as described below:
Lemma 6. Suppose that λ ∈ [λ,λ]. Under minimal intervention, one-period payoff of projects is given by v θ (λ, {q min , I min }) = p θ R θ .
Putting this together, we can characterize the equilibrium under minimal intervention following a large adverse shock that results in λ 0 <λ: Otherwise, we obtain a no recovery equilibrium.
A key insight is that even though the intent of minimal intervention is to intervene only when necessary, illiquidity necessitates intervention. That is, just as the regulator cannot commit to providing subsidies when markets are liquid, the regulator cannot commit to not providing subsidies when markets are illiquid. As a result, no commitment, while increasing net output in the current period, potentially destroys incentives. When this is the case, λ t decreases, which necessitates intervention to continue indefinitely. Note, even if asset quality deteriorates under intervention, intervention directly increases output by enabling investment. As a result, whether welfare improves or declines relative to laissez-faire largely depends on the intertemporal trade-off (i.e. long-lived agents' discount rate β). Intervention does, however, have unambiguous effects on incentives relative to laissez-faire: 2. otherwise, asset quality is weakly lower relative to laissez-faire.
Proposition 7 (Intervention Trap
)
Jump-starting Liquidity
Implicitly, no commitment enables the regulator to the react to market conditions. At the cost of this flexibility, the regulator cannot influence private incentives of market participants, who correctly anticipate intervention under illiquid conditions. In this section, we demonstrate that, under commitment, promising "over-stimulus" could expedite recovery.
Under commitment, the regulator's intervention is announced prior to farmers' effort decisions. As a result, {q, I} takes into its account its impact on farmers' incentives. Our main result is that the regulator optimally commits to a bigger subsidization to investors than under the miniminal intervention in order to ensure effort incentives. and for which we obtain a full recovery equilibrium.
Under commitment, the regulator fully internalizes the impact of regulation on incentives. The equilibrium intervention in the commitment regime, referred to henceforth as "c-intervention" reveals two important qualities. First, the regulator offers (weakly) larger subsidies q relative to minimal intervention. When incentives are taken into account, the regulator chooses a larger subsidy q, and by doing so lowers the cost of capital to farmers. As conditional on holding a good asset, farmers are able to retain a larger fraction of their certainty return L g , intervention actually improves the incentive problem. Second, the regulator activates intervention even when λ >λ. In a commitment regime, because intervention can not only relieve illiquidity but ultimately maximize total output, intervention occurs as long as farmers are unable to collectively improve market quality. Together, c-intervention always leads to a full recovery equilibrium.
Importantly, because interventions support farmers' incentives until markets recover to λ =λ, markets are able to transition into a long-run λ * = 1 within finite periods of time. This yields the following result:
Proposition 10 (Bigger Interventions). Suppose that λ 0 ∈ [λ,λ). Under c-intervention, intervention occurs for finite periods to a steady state λ * = 1.
As with minimal intervention, c-intervention immediately restores liquidity, thereby creating short-term gains relative to laissez-faire. Additionally, c-intervention induces effort by all farmers, thereby (weakly) improving the speed of asset quality: Proposition 11. Suppose that λ 0 ∈ [λ,λ). Under c-intervention, output and asset quality is weakly greater relative to laissez-faire and minimal intervention.
Policy Equivalence
In this section, we show that insights on the main intervention policy instrument applies to a broader set of policies. In this section, we show that our main policy intervention can be implemented with a (1) program that directly subsidizes farmers and (2) interest rate policy with respect to r f . Direct subsidized lending program. Consider an intervention policy in which the regulator directly provides subsidized lending to farmers. Let the regulator offers to lend s bonds with zero coupon and face value 1, for which in return farmers are required to pay τ (or up to L θ ). The intervention offers up to K bonds to farmers at first-come first-serve basis, and is activated for a set of λ ∈ I. We show that:
Proposition 12. For any market intervention with policy {q, I}, there exists a corresponding {s, τ, I, K} that is outcome and cost equivalent.
Risk-free interest rate policy. Let r f ,t be used to denote the one-period risk-free return in period t that is accessible to investors. Consider an alternate policy where at every period t, the regulator chooses the short-term riskfree rate r f ,t . As long as r f ,t is unbounded (e.g. no zero lower bound), there exists a mapping between any policy {q, I} can some r f that achieves the same outcome: 5 Proposition 13. For any market intervention with policy {q, I}, there exists an interest rate policy {r f , I} that is outcome equivalent.
Delaying Intervention
So far, we characterized intervention in a setting in which the regulator does not face a budget constraint. When unconstrained, the regulator always optimally intervenes early to capture the benefits of efficiently restoring liquidity. When the regulator is constrained, however, the timing of intervention matters because interventions in certain periods may offer more bang-for-the-buck than others.
Recall that when c > ∆L 1−β , farmers had incentives to exert effort even when markets are illiquid. For a large shock that leads to λ 0 <λ, delaying intervention is costly as markets are impaired. However, the regulator may not have enough resources to implement the unconstrained c − intervention. Delaying intervention until it is necessary to incentivize collective effort could economize on resources and ensure long-run liquidity.
We illustrate this point using a stark example. Let c > ∆L 1−β andλ + (1 −λ)π <λ, which corresponds to the recovery equilibrium in Proposition 4. Suppose that the regulator can only use at most K = 1 + r f −λ(∆R + L g − c) − (1 −λ)L b , which corresponds to the cost of a one-time c-intervention when λ =λ. If the regulator were to intervene at any time before market quality recovered toλ, K would be sufficient to finance a large enough intervention program that would induce incentives. As a result, intervention would achieve short-term market liquidity, coupled with a decline in market quality. By delaying intervention until λ t reachedλ, the regulator is able to induce effort and ensure full recovery. This implies that as long as the regulator is patient (i.e. large β), delaying intervention strictly dominates.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of a collateralized asset market with asymmetric information. We show that minimal interventions markets can fall into "intervention traps" -expectations concerning future interventions eliminate private incentives to improve the quality of collateral, which stunts recovery and warrants continued market intervention. Committing to bigger interventions may lead to faster recoveries, and prolonging intervention even after market liquidity is restored may be optimal. A direct takeaway is that government interventions designed to boost liquidity in frozen markets must also take into account its impact on private incentives to maintain high-quality assets. More generally, our paper provides a rationale for maintaining a program of market intervention even outside of extreme conditions, such as a financial crisis. Offering timely relief through interventions can be shown to be an economical solution to preserving market health, especially if more severe conditions will eventually necessitate intervention. 
A Proofs
A.1 Lemma 1
A.2 Lemma 2
Proof. Follows directly from text.
A.3 Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose that c < ∆v (1) 1−β . Then, ∑ ∞ t=0 β t ∆v(1) > c. Hence, for a sequence λ t = 1 for t = 0, 1, 2, ..., Condition (IC) holds, i.e. individual farmers find it optimal to exert effort. Under the law of motion given by Equation (3), λ t+1 = 1 for λ t = 1 if e = 1 for all farmers. Since effort is incentive compatible conditional on all other farmers exerting effort, under coordinated effort, λ t = 1 for ∀t.
A.4 Proposition 1
Proof. First we show existence by example. Lemma 3 directly implies the existence of longrun value of 1. Next, suppose that c > ∆L 1−β and consider a candidate path where λ t = 0 for ∀ t. Since ∆v(0) + βV(0) = ∆L 1−β , there exists an equilibrium in which no farmers exert effort for any t, and λ t trivially approaches 0. Finally, suppose that c is such that 
for some arbitrarily small > 0. 6 Note that conditional on λ 0 =λ, conditional on full effort where λ 1 =λ + (1 −λ)π, individual farmers do not choose e = 1. Conditional on λ t =λ for ∀t > 0, we can express gains from effort:
Hence, farmers are indifferent between e = 0 and e = 1. Symmetric mixed strategy of exerting effort with probability µ = 1 2 rationalizes the sequenceλ. Hence, an equilibrium exists with λ * ≈λ.
Second, We rule out all other long-run values of λ t by contradiction. Consider an equilibrium in which λ t approaches some value Y. Suppose that this is a no recovery equilibrium. This implies that there exists some λ = Y ∈ (0,λ) such that λ = Y given the law of motion. Since 1−β = c, in which case coordinated effort is possible, no such full recovery equilibrium exists. Lastly, suppose that this is a recovery equilibrium. Since only for Y =λ does there exist an arbitrarily small such that markets are illiquid for Y − , there does not exist a Y =λ for a recovery equilibrium.
A.5 Lemma 4
Proof. By Lemma 3, full recovery equilibrium exists for λ 0 = 1. For some small :
which approaches 0 as → 0. Hence, there exists aλ = 1 −¯ for some¯ > 0 such that ∆v(λ) + β∆V(λ + (1 −λ)π) = c.
A.6 Corollary 1
Proof. Since under coordinated effort, when λ 0 =˙λ −π 1−π , λ 1 =λ, by Proposition 4, a full recovery equilibrium exists.
A.7 Proposition 2
Proof. Letλ + (1 −λ)π ≥λ and consider the first case where c > ∆L 1−β . We show that there exists a full recovery equilibrium for any λ 0 ∈ [λ −π 1−π , 1] for some thresholdλ −π 1−π by characterizing a cutoffλ for which individual farmers' effort decisions are consistent with a λ t path with full effort. Letλ =λ ifλ >λ. Otherwise, ifλ =λ then it implies that there exists some λ <λ where:
Letλ ≤λ be the cutoff at which:
Given the characterization ofλ, effort is exerted by all farmers for any λ 0 ≥λ −π 1−π . For any λ <λ −π 1−π , gains from effort conditional on a path of full effort is such that:
where the above holds because c > ∆L 1−β implies that E[∆V(λ + (1 −λ)π)] > c, from which we can infer that ∆V(λ) (weakly) increases in λ. This implies that effort is not incentive compatible even if all other farmers exert effort for all periods. Hence, a full recovery equilibrium does not exist. Consider instead a candidate equilibrium path in which no farmers exert effort. Again, since c > ∆L 1−β , individual farmers find it optimal to choose e = 0. Since the candidate path is consistent with no farmers exerting effort, there exists an equilibrium with no recovery for λ 0 ∈ (0,λ
Next, consider when c < ∆L 1−β . Suppose that conditional on a path with full effort, τ is the first period at which λ τ ≥λ. We can express farmers' gain from effort at t = 0 as:
This establishes that effort is incentive compatible for each farmer conditional on a full effort path. Hence there exists a full recovery equilibrium for any λ 0 .
A.8 Proposition 3
Proof. Recall, full recovery requires there to exist a incentive compatible transition path that reaches λ t where λ τ ≥λ in some period τ. By construction,λ + (1 −λ)π <λ implies that for set [λ,λ] where for λ t ∈ [λ,λ], individual farmers' effort decision is such that e = 0 is strictly dominating strategy at t conditional on beliefs that all other farmers exert effort in the current and all future periods. From this, we can infer that there does not exist feasible transition path to full recovery: any candidate path with λ 0 <˙λ −π 1−π , must have some t at which λ t ∈ [λ,λ], as there does not exist a λ ≤λ where λ + (1 − λ)π ≥λ. However, effort is not incentive compatible given such λ t , which implies that full recovery does not exist.
A.9 Proposition 4
Proof. Letλ + (1 −λ)π <λ. Proposition 3 implies that for λ 0 ≤˙λ −π 1−π , no full recovery exists. We show that this implies that c ≤ ∆R 1−β . To see this, note that
1−β , which corresponds to the marginal value of effort conditional on a path of λ t =λ for t ≥ 0. However, since
, if c ≤ ∆R 1−β , then a full recovery equilibrium exists.
Rearrangingλ + (1 −λ)π <λ we getλ
effort is not compatible for any λ t <˙λ −π 1−π conditional on a recovery path with long-run λ * =λ. Hence, there does not exist any λ 0 < λ t <˙λ −π 1−π that permits a transition toλ, i.e. no equilibrium with recovery exists. Consider instead a candidate equilibrium where
1−β , the candidate path of λ t is consistent with no effort exerted by any farmer. Hence, a no-recovery equilibrium exists.
Next, suppose that c ≤ ∆L 1−β and consider a farmer's effort decision at t conditional on λ t =λ for ∀t > t , whereλ 
consistent with the characterization in Proposition 1. Note that when λ t =λ,
For any λ t −1 ∈ (λ
, there exists a subgame equilibrium with recovery, in which all farmers exert effort with probability µ, where µλ t −1 + (1 − µ)(1 − π)λ t −1 + µπ(1 − λ t −1 ) =λ and λ t ≈λ for t ≥ t . Next, consider any λ 0 <λ −π 1−π . Since:
effort is incentive compatible for any λ 0 <λ −π 1−π conditional on a sequence of λ t that evolves according to λ = λ + (1 − λ)π until it reachesλ, after which it is followed by an infinite sequence of λ tλ . This establishes the existence of a recovery equilibrium for λ 0 <˙λ −π 1−π .
A.10 Lemma 5
Proof.
A.11 Proposition 5
Proof. Consider the regulator's policy decision given λ. The regulator chooses some {q, I} to maximize:
First, suppose that λ >λ. Taking the differential of the net output between a policy {q , I } where λ ∈ I and policy {q , I } with λ / ∈ I ,
This implies that under no commitment, no λ / ∈ I for any λ ≥λ. Next, consider λ <λ. Following the same exercise, taking the differential of the net output between a policy {q , I } where λ ∈ I and q sufficiently large such that λL g + (1 − λ)(L b + q ) ≥ 1 + r f , and policy {q , I } with λ / ∈ I ,
farmers' one-period utility
investors' net utility
. This implies that under no commitment, an intervention policy that restores market liquidity is desirable for λ ∈ [λ,λ). Finally, consider the optimal q conditional on I = [0,λ). Note that the minimum q such that
For any q > q min , the differential of the net output is given by
Hence, the optimal intervention policy under no commitment is {q, I} = {q min , [λ,λ)}.
A.12 Lemma 6
Proof. Under minimal intervention, q min =
Consider a farmer who deviates to no effort. The farmer obtains:
Deviating is not profitable since:
Hence, a full recovery equilibrium exists. Finally, consider whenλ =λ. We show that there exists a full recovery equilibrium for λ 0 ≥ ... λ for some threshold ... λ . Ifλ =λ, then:
Since ∆V increases in λ for λ ≥λ, this implies that there exists some ... λ ≤λ which is given by:
This establishes the existence of a recovery equilibrium when λ 0 ≥ ... λ . Consider the remaining case whenλ + (1 −λ)π <λ. This implies that even under full effort, an individual farmer does not find it optimal to exert effort:
Recall that ∆R 1−β < c ifλ + (1 −λ)π <λ . Since ∆V(λ) > ∆R, this shows that an equilibrium with full recovery does not exist. Note also that no effort is a best response to any λ ∈ [λ,λ]. Hence, given initial condition λ 0 ∈ [λ,λ), it follows that λ t <λ for all subsequent t. Hence, we obtain an equilibrium of no recovery.
A.14 Proposition 7
Proof. Following Proposition 6, we know that a full recovery exists if (1) c < ∆R 1−β or (2) λ + (1 −λ)π ≥λ and λ 0 ≥ ... λ . Since full recovery implies that intervention is no longer activated at some period τ > 0, intervention occurs for finite periods to a steady state λ * = 1. Consider the remaining cases. From Proposition 6, we know that in all other cases, we obtain no recovery in equilibrium. Suppose that c > ∆L 1−β . Since:
for any path with no recovery, effort is not incentive compatible for any farmer. Hence, in equilibrium, λ * = 0. In addition, since λ t monotonically decreases, there exists some τ for which λ τ ≤ λ, which implies that for any t > τ, λ t / ∈ I min . Finally, consider when c < ∆L 1−β . We show by contradiction that the no recovery equilibrium does not have steady state λ * = 0. Suppose that is the case, and λ t −1 = 0 < λ. Under a steady state, λ t = 0. However, conditional on λ t = 0 for all t > t − 1, a farmer chooses e = 1 if:
Since V(0) = ∆L 1−β for the proposed equilibrium path, and c < ∆L 1−β , farmers find it optimal to exert effort. However, this implies that λ t > 0. We conjecture and verify that instead there exists an approximate steady state λ * = λ. Letλ = λ given bŷ 
Consider when λ =λ. The farmers' effort condition is given by
This implies that
Note, farmers are indifferent between e = 1 and e = 0. A symmetric mixing strategy µ = 1 2 is consistent with a equilibrium approximate steady state with λ * = λ. Following the argument in Proposition 1, it can be shown than λ is the unique approximate steady state.
A.15 Proposition 8
Proof. Under minimal intervention, full recovery implies that all farmers exerted effort for all t > 0. Hence, asset quality improves at least as fast as laissez-faire. In addition, for any λ 0 <λ −π 1−π , markets are liquid only under intervention, which implies that output is strictly greater (by λ 1 p g R g + (1 − λ 1 )p b R b ), while for any λ t , weakly greater quality implies that output is at least as large as in the case of laissez-faire.
Recall, in the cases for which minimal intervention results in no recovery (c > ∆R 1−β and λ 0 < ... λ ), the corresponding laissez-faire equilibrium is given by: In case (i), asset quality is greater under laissez-faire since it undergoes full recovery. In case (ii), sinceλ > λ, asset quality is greater under laissez-faire. In case (iii), asset quality is identical. Together this confirms that asset quality is (weakly) greater under laissezfaire.
A.16 Proposition 9
Proof. Consider the regulator's policy decision given some initial value λ t −1 . The regulator chooses some {q, I} to maximize the net output, taking into consideration the impact that intervention has on λ t (λ t −1 , {q, I}), the quality after farmers' effort decision. We conjecture and verify that the optimal policy is {q c , I c } is given by: First, note that setting when full recovery is possible and efficient given Assumption 4 under the minimal intervention, the regulator commits to minimal intervention, which is the lowest cost intervention that induces full recovery. Hence, it suffices to check that when conditions for case 1. are not met, the specified {q c , I c } is optimal. Under case 2., minimal intervention, q c sets B(λ, {q c , I c }) = ∆R + L g − (1 − β)c if B(λ) > ∆R + L g − (1 − β)c. We can explicitly express q c when q c = q min as
First, we show that for any policy, it is not optimal to have λ ∈ I for any λ ∈ [λ, 1]. Consider a farmers' effort decision for some λ t −1 . If λ t −1 ≥˙λ −π 1−π , as a consequence of Lemma 4, all farmers exert effort even without intervention. From Lemma 1 we can infer that intervention weakly improves incentives in λ t for λ t >λ. Given a policy {q , I } where λ ∈ I and policy {q , I } with λ / ∈ I , this implies that λ t (λ t −1 , {q , I }) = λ t (λ t −1 , {q , I }) since maximal effort is exerted by farmers with or without intervention. Hence, λ / ∈ I for any λ >λ. Next, we show that under {q c , I c }, gains from effort conditional on a full recovery path (i.e. full effort by all farmers for all subsequent t) is bounded below by:
Since effort is incentive compatible, {q c , I c } achieves a full recovery equilibrium for any λ 0 . Since q c is set such that agents' incentive conditions are binding conditional on intervention, q c is the minimum cost subsidy conditional on restoring liquidity and restoring incentives.
Taking the difference, we obtain: 
which is strictly greater than zero under Assumption 3. Finally, we show that conditional on a full recovery equilibrium being optimal given some initial value λ 0 ≥ λ, c-intervention, relative to laissez-faire is desirable.
Consider the net output under c-intervention: 
Suppose that under laissez-faire, effort is exerted. This implies that under laissez-faire, we get:
Taking the difference:
where the future expected difference is positive since the one-period net output difference (weakly) increases for consecutive periods. Assumption 4 directly implies that output under the c-intervention is greater than that under laissez-faire without full recovery for λ ≤ λ.
good farmers are indifferent between participation and non-participation under policy {s , τ , I , K }. Policy {s , τ , I , K } replicates farmers' payoffs under policy {q, I}. In addition, cost of policy {s , τ , I , K } is:
which is equivalent to the that of policy {q, I}.
A.20 Proposition 13
Proof. We show that for any {q, I}, there exists a policy {r f , I } that is equivalent. Fix policy {q, I}, and WLOG, suppose that q is such that markets are liquid whenever λ ∈ I. Recall that B(λ, {q, I}) = 1+r f −(1−λ)(L b +q) λ . Set I = I and consider a policy r f where:
Rearranging, we get r f = r f − (1 − λ)q. Since lowering the riskfree rate to r f leads to a cost of capital B that is equivalent to that induced by {q, I}, policy {r f , I } is outcome equivalent.
B Supplementary Figures
All figures are simulations of the model with β = 0 and L b R b ≥ 1 + r f +c, which implies that λ = 0. 
B.1 Minimal Intervention

